title. Regarding St. Catherine's, he stated:
The starting point of the Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal title is the Privy Council's decision in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46, which described aboriginal title as a "personal and usufructuary right" (at p. 54). The subsequent jurisprudence has attempted to grapple with this definition, and has in the process demonstrated that the Privy Council's choice of terminology is not particularly helpful to explain the various dimensions of aboriginal title. What the Privy Council sought to capture is that aboriginal title is a sui generis interest in land. Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from "normal" proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives. 5 On the "personal" aspect of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J. explained that this simply means it is inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown, not that it is "a nonproprietary interest which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the land and cannot compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests". 6 Turning to the source of Aboriginal title, he said that ... it had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal title in Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763: see St. Catherine's Milling. However, it is now clear that although aboriginal title was recognized by the Proclamation, it arises from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples. That prior occupation, however, is relevant in two different ways, both of which illustrate the sui generis nature of aboriginal title. The first is the physical fact of occupation, which derives from the common law principle that occupation is proof of possession in law.... Thus, in Guerin [Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335] Dickson J. described aboriginal title, at p. 376, as a "legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands".... [I] n Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, ... this Court unanimously held at p. 340 that "aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the British and survived British claims of sovereignty" (also see Guerin at p. 378). What this suggests is a second source for aboriginal title -the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. At common law, Chief Justice Lamer explained, "the fact of physical occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will ground title to the land". 9 So if Aboriginal claimants are able to prove that they are descended from or are the successors to Indigenous people who were in exclusive occupation of specific lands at the time the British Crown asserted sovereignty, they will have
Aboriginal title in the absence of adequate proof by the Crown of subsequent extinguishment of their title. 10 Indigenous law is relevant to proof of occupation because an Indigenous land tenure system, laws governing land use, and trespass laws, to give Lamer C.J.'s examples, could be relied upon to establish the 7 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 114. Compare the concurring judgment of La Forest J., especially at para. 190: "the aboriginal right of possession is derived from the historic occupation and use of ancestral lands by aboriginal peoples. Put another way, 'aboriginal title' is based on the continued occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal peoples' traditional way of life. 23 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1, Lamer C.J. at para. 145: "aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted." For reasons relating to the way the case was pleaded and the way the trial judge dealt with the oral histories, the Supreme Court did not issue a declaration of title, deciding instead to send the matter back to trial to determine what lands had been exclusively occupied by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en in 1846. The case has not been retried. 24 Ibid. at para. 113. 25 Ibid. at para. The Court's task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that practice, as faithfully and objectively as it can, into a modern legal right.... This exercise involves both aboriginal and European perspectives. The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice from the perspective of the aboriginal people. But in translating it to a common law right, the Court must also consider the European perspective; the nature of the right at common law must be examined to determine whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it. She emphasized that "to insist that the pre-sovereignty practices correspond in some broad sense to the modern right claimed, is not to ignore the aboriginal perspective. The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues its every step. It must be considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a generous approach must be taken in matching it to the appropriate modern right." ... when dealing with a claim of "aboriginal title", the court will focus on the occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal society's traditional way of life. In pragmatic terms, this means looking at the manner in which the society used the land to live, namely to establish villages, to work, to get to work, to hunt, to travel to hunting grounds, to fish, to get to fishing pools, to conduct religious rites, etc. [Emphasis in original].
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But the practices must be sufficient to prove occupation as a matter of fact in order 36 Ibid. at para. 50. 37 Ibid. at para. 54. 38 Ibid. at para. 49, quoting from Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. Ibid. at para. 127. 50 Ibid. at para. 128. 51 Ibid. at para. 129. LeBel J. also quoted Lamer C.J.'s statement that Aboriginal title "cannot be completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives": ibid., quoting from Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 112. 52 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 130.
is more than evidence: it is actually law." , 100, especially at 104, 106; Slattery, "Metamorphosis", above note 27 at 270; Slattery, "Constitutional Dimensions", above note 19 at 52-54. 59 Tsilhqot'in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3. 60 Ibid. at paras. 51-66.
issues, such as making clear that Aboriginal title is territorial rather than sitespecific, and deciding that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity no longer operates to prevent provincial laws from applying to Aboriginal title lands. Turning to the sufficiency requirement, which she said "lies at the heart of this appeal", she said it "must be approached from both the common law To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal group in question must show that it has historically acted in a way that would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own purposes. This standard does not demand notorious or visible use akin to proving a claim for adverse possession, but neither can the occupation be purely subjective or internal. There must be evidence of a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the exclusive stewardship of the claimant group. As just discussed, the kinds of acts necessary to indicate a permanent presence and intention to hold and use the land for the group's purposes are dependent on the manner of life of the people and the nature of the land. Cultivated fields, constructed dwelling houses, invested labour, and a consistent presence on parts of the land may be sufficient, but are not essential to establish occupation. The notion of occupation must also reflect the way of life of the Aboriginal people, including those who were nomadic or seminomadic. 
Delgamuukw:
A consideration of the aboriginal perspective may also lead to the conclusion that trespass by other aboriginal groups does not undermine, and that presence of those groups by permission may reinforce, the exclusive occupation of the aboriginal group asserting title. For example, the aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such that the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that permission were the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations in question, those treaties would also form part of the aboriginal perspective. However, as demonstrated by the factual findings of Justice Vickers in Tsilhqot'in Nation, the British presence in the Tsilhqot'in territory in 1846 was no greater than in the territories of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en further north. 68 The Oregon Boundary Treaty of that year was really a non-event for the Tsilhqot'in, as they continued to live by their laws and govern themselves thereafter. 69 So as discussed above in relation to the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, internally the Tsilhqot'in's
Aboriginal title must be sourced in and continue to be regulated by their own laws and governance authority. And yet, in her discussion of the application of provincial laws to their Aboriginal title lands, McLachlin C.J. suggested that there could be a legal vacuum if provincial legislation was excluded by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. 70 What about Tsilhqot'in law? If it survived Crown assertion of sovereignty and continued after 1846, as it must have, how and when did it cease to be in effect? With respect, I think the Supreme Court has overlooked these questions and failed to take the continuing application of Tsilhqot'in law and governance authority into account. 71 At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown title, however, was burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of Aboriginal people who occupied and used the land prior to European arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Aboriginal interest in land that burdens the Crown's underlying title is an independent legal interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown. 72 From this passage, it appears that the Crown could acquire the radical or underlying title to Tsilhqot'in lands by mere assertion, despite the fact that there was no British governmental presence in the Tsilhqot'in territory and no way of enforcing English law there. 73 But as discussed above, in principle this must mean that the Tsilhqot'in's Aboriginal title, which at common law also vested at same time in 1846, 74 was protected by that law against the outside world, including the Crown, from then on. 75 This is the external aspect of Aboriginal title. The content of the Crown's underlying title is what is left when Aboriginal title is subtracted from it: s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867; Delgamuukw. As we have seen, Delgamuukw establishes that Aboriginal title gives "the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land ... for a variety of purposes", not confined to traditional or "distinctive" uses (para. 117). In other words, Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest in the land: Guerin, at p. 382. In simple terms, the title holders have the right to the benefits associated with the land -to use it, enjoy it and profit from its economic development. As such, the Crown does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal title land.
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Aboriginal titleholders are therefore entitled to the entire benefit of the land, whereas the Crown's underlying title is limited to "two related elements -a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people when dealing with
Aboriginal lands, and the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the government can justify this in the broader public interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 76 See Tsilhqot'in Nation, B.C.S.C., above note 62 at paras. 267-86. 77 At common law, property rights are held by individuals and corporations, not by communities, so there is no common law in relation to communal rights that could apply directly in this context: see McNeil, "Exclusive Occupation", above note 60 at 834-38, 860-71. Nor am I aware of any colonial, provincial, or federal legislation that would have applied to govern the internal dimension of Aboriginal title. Even today there is no such legislation, nor would it necessarily be constitutional, which is one reason why Indigenous law must apply to govern Aboriginal title internally: see McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Provinces", above note 61. 78 Tsilhqot'in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at para. 70.
1982."
79 Fiduciary obligations and encroachment do not relate directly to the issues of source, nature, and content of Aboriginal title -they involve constitutional issues that are outside the scope of our present discussion.
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Conclusion
In summary, the Tsilhqot'in Nation decision confirms that Aboriginal title comes from exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, not from the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It is proprietary in nature and encompasses the entire beneficial interest in the land, subject to the inherent limit that the land cannot be used in ways that will substantially deprive future generations of its benefit. 81 The Crown's underlying title has no beneficial content whatsoever. The
Aboriginal perspective, including Indigenous law, must be taken into account in assessing claims to Aboriginal title, but it is unclear from Chief Justice McLachlin's judgment whether this law's role is limited to being part of the evidence used to prove exclusive occupation. As I have argued, Indigenous law and authority should also govern the internal dimensions of Aboriginal title, while the common law
